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Abstract 
Individuals with Williams syndrome (WS) show a specific deficit in visuo-spatial 
abilities. This finding, however, is mainly based on performance on small-scale 
laboratory-based tasks. This study investigated large-scale route learning in 
individuals with WS and two matched control groups (moderate learning difficulty 
group [MLD], typically developing group [TD]). In a non-labelling and a labelling 
(verbal information provided along the route) condition, participants were guided 
along one of two unfamiliar 1 km routes with 20 junctions, and then retraced the route 
themselves (two trials). The WS participants performed less well than the other 
groups, but given verbal information and repeated experience they learnt nearly all of 
the turns along the route. The extent of improvement in route knowledge (correct 
turns) in WS was comparable to that of the control groups. Relational knowledge 
(correctly identifying spatial relationships between landmarks), compared to the TD 
group, remained poor for both the WS and MLD groups. Assessment of the 
relationship between performance on the large-scale route learning task to that on 
three small-scale tasks (maze learning, perspective taking, map use) showed no 
relationship for the TD controls, and only a few non-specific associations in the MLD 
and WS groups. 
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Introduction 
Williams syndrome (WS) is a genetic disorder which occurs in 1 in 20,000 births 
(Morris & Mervis, 1999). People with WS have an IQ of approximately 60 (Udwin & 
Yule, 1990), which is usually comprised of higher verbal than visuo-spatial abilities 
(e.g. Bellugi, Wang & Jernigan, 1994; Grant et al., 1997). 
We investigated the visuo-spatial abilities of people with WS by asking them to 
learn a 1 km route through a University campus. Learning a route involves visuo-
spatial abilities which include perspective taking, encoding relationships between 
landmarks, and the sequence of turns along a route, and is part of developing an 
overall cognitive representation of an area (Siegel & White, 1975). We will refer to 
the route learning task as a „large-scale‟ spatial task, because it took place in a real 
environment. There has not been any previous research into the development of large-
scale knowledge in WS, and prior to the present research nothing has been known 
about how people with WS learn an unfamiliar landscape. Before we began the 
research we collected anecdotal reports from parents/ guardians of people with WS. 
This revealed a common belief that people with WS often get lost or disorientated in 
unfamiliar places. If this is the case, we expected people with WS to be less efficient 
(than typically developing [TD] people) in learning new environments. In support of 
this, fMRI and MRI investigation has shown atypical hippocampal metabolism in WS 
(Meyer-Lindenberg et al., 2005), an area implicated in large-scale route learning. This 
research has implications for spatial theories (discussed below). It also has practical 
implications, because identifying the type of deficits experienced by people with WS 
in large-scale tasks could lead to remedial interventions designed to improve 
wayfinding abilities. 
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In contrast to large-scale tasks there are many „small-scale‟ tests of spatial ability 
(Freundshuh, 2000). Such tasks are carried out in small spaces (e.g. in a laboratory, in 
a model layout, on a table top). Previous research with participants with WS has 
focused on their ability to perform small-scale spatial tasks (e.g. Landau & Hoffman, 
2007). The research with small-scale tasks has shown that, despite an overall impaired 
level of ability, WS participants have relative strengths and weaknesses in the spatial 
domain (Farran & Jarrold, 2003). Neuroanatomically, it was hypothesised that this 
reflects impaired dorsal stream functions (object localisation, perception for action) 
relative to ventral stream functions (object and face recognition) (Atkinson et al., 
1997). More recently, empirical evidence has pointed towards a further fractionation 
within the dorsal stream as some dorsal functions are more impaired than others 
(Atkinson et al., 2006; Farran & Jarrold, 2004; Jordan, Reiss, Hoffman & Landau, 
2002). In support of this, Meyer-Lindenberg et al. (2004) showed reduced dorsal 
stream activation for location coding in WS, relative to control participants. They 
relate this to a reduction in grey matter at the dorsal occipitoparietal sulcus/vertical 
part of the intraparietal sulcus, but emphasise that this would not impact all dorsal 
functions. 
Given the deficit within the visuo-spatial domain, albeit measured by small-scale 
tasks, coupled with cortical evidence, this suggests that large-scale route learning 
performance, as part of the visuo-spatial domain, should also be impaired. We were 
also interested in whether performance on small-scale tasks holds any predictive value 
on performance on large-scale tasks. We give below, examples of how impaired 
spatial abilities in WS might be detrimental in learning large spaces. These examples 
emphasise the importance of testing empirically whether one can assume a 
commonality between the spatial abilities required for a small-scale versus large-scale 
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task, and whether small-scale task performance extrapolates to large-scale abilities. 
Until now, this had not been assessed in WS, and the validity of such an assumption 
was unknown. 
Performance on construction and drawing tasks represents a relative weakness in 
WS, compared to performance on purely perceptual tasks (Farran & Jarrold, 2001). 
The pattern of performance on construction and drawing tasks shows a lack of global 
organisation, with more attention given to the details than the cohesive image, i.e. a 
local bias. If one were to assume that this related to large-scale ability, such a bias 
might be detrimental when people with WS need to develop knowledge of a large 
area, because such knowledge depends on organising partial perceptual views of an 
environment into a coherent cognitive representation of the whole area (Kitchin & 
Blades, 2002). 
Nardini, Atkinson, Braddick & Burgess (2008) reported a poor ability to use 
landmarks to find a target in a small-scale spatial array. This was most pronounced 
when participants had to rely on the spatial configuration of the array (intrinsic frame 
of reference), compared to when they could determine location relative to the position 
of their body (body frame of reference). If poor use of landmarks in a small-scale task 
relates to large-scale environments, this suggests that individuals with WS might find 
it difficult to both learn a sequence of turns and to encode the spatial relationship 
between landmarks, with greater impairment on the latter. Such deficits would 
seriously impair their cognitive representation of the environment.  
However, the deficits in small-scale spatial abilities in WS, does not necessarily 
mean that this group have deficits in large-scale spatial tasks. There is much evidence 
to suggest that spatial ability is not a single construct, but is composed of numerous 
mechanisms (Allen, Kirasic, Dobson, Long & Beck, 1996). Despite this, there is little 
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agreement as to what these independent constructs are (Quaiser-Pohl, Lehmaan & 
Eid, 2004). Hegarty & Waller (2005) reviewed most investigations of the relationship 
between spatial abilities at different scales and found that there was little or no 
relationship between performance on small-scale and large-scale tasks in TD adults. 
This has also been shown in TD children (Quaiser-Pohl et al., 2002). This suggests 
that these two types of task rely on different spatial mechanisms, and thus this 
distinction might also apply to WS.  
To our knowledge, there are no comparisons of brain activation while performing 
small-scale versus large-scale spatial tasks. However, dorsal stream activation 
features strongly in reports of small-scale task performance (e.g. Han, Song, Ding, 
Yund & Woods, 2001), whilst the hippocampus shows key activation in large-scale 
tasks (e.g. Hartley, Maguire, Spiers & Burgess, 2003). The hippocampus receives 
input from the dorsal stream, thus, although not fully independent, it appears that 
large-scale spatial abilities implicate distinct cortical areas, relative to small-scale 
spatial abilities. In relation to WS, both dorsal and hippocampal activation is atypical 
(Meyer-Lindenberg et al., 2004; 2005). 
Like other researchers, Allen et al. (1996) did not find any direct relationship 
between a set of small-scale psychometric tests and large-scale spatial performance 
(learning a route through a city) with TD adults, but they did find an indirect 
relationship. They found that two types of small-scale spatial tasks (maze learning, 
perspective taking) were related to both the psychometric measures and to large-scale 
environmental learning. Maze learning was related to route learning measures and 
perspective taking was related to measures of relational knowledge.  
Given Allen et al‟s (1996) findings, we included measures of maze learning and 
perspective taking in our study. The maze task was designed for young children 
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(Gathercole & Pickering, 2000) and so was simpler, but similar to the one used by 
Allen et al. (1996). Pilot work with a group of people with WS (who did not take part 
in the present experiment) indicated that a perspective taking task like the one used by 
Allen et al. (1996) for TD adults was too difficult for WS participants. Therefore we 
used a perspective taking task designed for young TD children (Massangkay et 
al.,1974). Given the relationship found by Allen et al. (1996) between small-scale 
(maze learning, perspective taking) and large-scale learning (route walking) we 
expected the same relationship to apply to the performance of participants in our 
study.  
We also considered how the ability to learn a route might be improved in WS, 
using two facilitation techniques. The first was a verbal labelling strategy. In one 
condition participants were given verbal information about the route while they 
experienced it for the first time. We know that verbal cognition is a relative strength 
in WS, so we thought that this relative strength might be used to scaffold performance 
in relatively weaker areas of cognition. Farran, Jarrold & Gathercole (1999) 
investigated WS performance on the Performance subtests of the Weschler 
Intelligence Scale for Children III (WISC III; Weschler, 1992). They demonstrated 
that the WISC III subtests which shared variance that was uniquely associated with 
performance on the British Picture Vocabulary Scale (Dunn, Dunn, Whetton & 
Pintilie, 1982), a verbal measure, represented higher levels of visuo-spatial 
performance. In contrast, the subtests that shared variance which was uniquely 
associated with performance on Raven‟s Coloured Progressive Matrices (Raven, 
1993), a measure of non-verbal ability, represented lower levels of visuo-spatial 
ability. This demonstrated that, in WS, when a non-verbal task allows an increased 
input from verbal cognition, this is a beneficial strategy to elevate performance.  
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The above interaction between verbal and non-verbal ability appears to be bi-
directional: some aspects of spatial language are relatively impaired within the verbal 
domain in WS (Laing & Jarrold, 2007; Landau & Hoffman, 2005; Lukács, Pléh & 
Racsmány, 2007; Phillips et al., 2004). Laing & Jarrold (2007) demonstrated that 
when spatial comparisons relied on spatial models (whether the blue or red animal is 
physically bigger on the page) participants with WS showed a significant deficit, 
relative to when comparisons relied on semantic knowledge (whether a bear or snail is 
bigger). Lukács et al. (2007) showed a similar differentiation between performance on 
spatial language tasks which activate spatial models compared to those that do not 
require on-line spatial analysis. In our labelling condition, the information about the 
route involved pointing out objects along the route within their spatial context using 
spatial terms such as „next to‟ and „passed‟. As individuals with WS can understand 
the semantics of such terms, we anticipated that any facilitation in the WS group 
would not be inhibited by the use of spatial language. 
Farran et al. (1999) did not explicitly encourage verbal strategies for task 
completion, and therefore people with WS may use such strategies spontaneously. In 
the present study, it is therefore possible that introducing a verbal strategy for route 
learning might not have a facilitatory effect on performance in the WS group, as they 
may already be using a verbal strategy. Any improvement in performance was 
therefore considered in comparison to a group of individuals with moderate learning 
difficulties (MLD) and a group of TD individuals. We predicted that the relative 
magnitude of any facilitatory effect of explicitly encouraging a verbal strategy when 
learning the route would determine the extent to which each group spontaneously use 
verbal strategies. That is, if verbal strategies are already in place, little or no 
 9 
facilitation should be evident, but if verbal strategies are not spontaneously used, 
facilitation effects should be observed. 
The second facilitation effect was the use of repetition. We asked participants to 
re-trace the route twice, i.e. after experiencing the route and retracing it once, they 
were asked to retrace it a second time. Repeated experience of routes by TD 
individuals usually results in rapid learning (Kitchin & Blades, 2001) and therefore 
we expected the TD controls to be at or near ceiling on retrace 2. If the participants 
with WS also benefited from repeated experience we expected them to perform better 
on retrace 2 than retrace 1.  
However, route recall depends on long term memory, which is poor in WS. This 
has been shown for both verbal and visuo-spatial long term memory tasks, although 
the relative performance on verbal and visuo-spatial tasks shows mixed patterns of 
ability (Vicari, Brizzolara, Carlesimo, Pezzini & Volterra, 1996; Jarrold et al., 2007; 
Brock, Brown & Boucher, 2006). Vicari et al. (1996) showed a relative deficit in a 
visuo-spatial memory task (Rey Figures) compared to a verbal memory task (word list 
learning). In contrast, Jarrold et al. (2007), found similarly poor visual and verbal 
memory, using the doors and people task (Baddeley, Emslie & Nimmo-Smith, 1994). 
As route learning is a long term memory task, we predicted that the performance of 
the WS participants would be poorer than the performance of the TD controls, but that 
immediate repetition might be a useful strategy for improving their large-scale route 
learning.  
We also included a spatial representation task based on Blades & Cooke (1994): 
participants used a map of a room to find a target location in the room. We wanted to 
find out if participants with WS could apply information gained from a small-scale 
representation (the map) to the large space (the room) that it represented. We reasoned 
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that, if participants with WS demonstrated an ability to use representations, map using 
might be another way to facilitate environmental learning in WS. 
In summary, the present study investigated large-scale spatial knowledge in 
WS, an issue that has not been investigated before. Both stages of large-scale spatial 
knowledge development (route learning, relational knowledge) were measured. 
Control groups of TD and MLD participants were included. We note that although 
there have been many studies of real world spatial development in the typical 
population, MLD participants have not been studied in large real environments 
before. We considered the effects of providing participants with verbal information 
about the route while they were learning it, and also the effects of practice on those 
participants who retraced the route more than once. We also assessed participants‟ 
performance on two small-scale tasks which, based on previous findings (Allen et al., 
1996) we expected to correlate with performance on the large-scale task. Finally, we 
included a map task to determine whether participants could transfer information 
learnt from small-scale representation to a real room. We have made some 
predictions, based on our assumptions about how the abilities and limitations of 
people with WS might apply in a large-scale learning task. 
 
Method 
Participants 
Twenty participants with WS were recruited via the Williams Syndrome 
Foundation, UK. All participants had received a positive diagnosis of WS based on 
phenotypic and genetic information. Genetic diagnosis was based on a Fluorescent 
insitu Hybridisation (FISH) test. The FISH test identifies the deletion of elastin on the 
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long arm of chromosome 7, that occurs in approximately 95% of individuals with WS 
(Lenhoff, Wang, Greenberg & Bellugi, 1997).  
Two control groups were included; a group of participants with non-specific 
moderate learning difficulties (MLD) and a group of typically developing (TD) 
participants. Full Scale IQ (FSIQ) was determined using the Wechsler Abbreviated 
Scale of Intelligence (WASI; Wechsler, 1999). The WASI consists of four subtests; 
Block Design and Matrix Reasoning as Performance measures, and Vocabulary and 
Similarities as Verbal measures. The FSIQ of the WS and MLD participants was 
calculated from their performance on all four subtests. The FSIQ of the TD 
participants was calculated from their performance on the Vocabulary and Matrix 
Reasoning subtests. 
Each participant with WS was individually matched to a participant with MLD 
and to a TD participant. WS and MLD participants were matched on the basis of 
chronological age (CA) and Performance IQ. WS and TD participants were matched 
by CA. Participant details are shown in Table 1.  
 
Table 1  
 
 In Table 1, the WS group do not appear to show the characteristic discrepancy 
of higher Verbal IQ than Performance IQ. This is due to two related factors. First, this 
discrepancy typically emerges with development (Jarrold, Baddeley & Hewes, 1998a) 
and the participants included here had not reached the end stage of development (14 
of the WS group were under 18 years). Second, many of the WS group scored at floor 
on one or more of the four WASI subtests, which could mask any VIQ-PIQ 
discrepancies (an effect also observed by Arnold et al., 1985; Udwin et al., 1986; 
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Pagon et al., 1987). To explore this, we calculated the VIQ-PIQ discrepancy in the six 
individuals with WS who did not show floor effects on either of the two VIQ subtests 
(although, three of these WS participants showed floor effects on one of the PIQ 
subtests, thus potentially still constraining any discrepancy). The VIQ-PIQ 
discrepancy for these individuals was: 14, -11, 15, 1, 16 and 11 respectively. Thus, 
those who had reached a later stage of development and were not affected by floor 
effects, overall showed the VIQ-PIQ discrepancy, characteristic of WS. 
Design and Procedure 
Route walking 
Participants were guided by an experimenter along two different routes (A and 
B) on the campus of Reading University. None of the participants had had any 
previous experience of either of the routes. Each route was 1 km long and each 
included 20 „choice points‟. A choice point was a junction along the route where 
participants had to decide whether to turn left, turn right, or walk straight ahead. Each 
of the routes also included four landmarks which were unique places along the route 
(e.g. red door, large green bin, bench). One landmark was at the start of each route, 
and the other three landmarks were distributed along the route. Each route was along 
paths between large University buildings so that participants had only limited views 
ahead. There were no unique, salient landmarks such as high buildings or other 
features that could have served as distant landmarks (although, we cannot rule out the 
sun being used as a directional landmark), and we tested participants during the 
summer when trees and bushes were all in full leaf and these further limited views 
across the campus.  
A script was used by the experimenter while leading the participant along each 
route. To make the task as clear as possible, participants were told to think of the 
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experimenter as a bus driver who was taking them along the route and that later it 
would be their turn to drive the bus (i.e. lead the way) from the start to the end of the 
route. As participants walked each route the four landmarks were pointed out by name 
(e.g. red door). The landmarks were described as „bus stops‟ and participants were 
told to remember where the bus stops were so that they could stop the bus when it was 
their turn to be the driver. 
There were two conditions. In the non-labelling condition, the remainder of 
the script was not descriptive of the route, and as the participants were guided along 
the route they were given only non-specific instructions like „this way now‟.  In the 
labelling condition, participants were given instructions that included directional 
information and information about features along the route (e.g.  „… down this little 
path and past the fish pond‟). 
After a participant had been guided around the route once by the experimenter, 
s/he was asked to take a turn as the „bus driver‟, and retrace the route leading the 
experimenter. Participants‟ turns at each choice point were noted, and the number of 
correct turns (maximum: 20) was used as a measure of route knowledge. If a 
participant made an incorrect turn at a choice point this was recorded as incorrect, and 
the experimenter led them back to the junction and asked them to make another 
choice. Only participants‟ first choice of turn at each junction was scored. 
When retracing the route, participants were asked to stop at each of the four 
landmarks („bus stops‟), from where they were asked to point to the other three 
landmarks (a total of 12 pointing choices while retracing a route). The four landmarks 
were never directly visible from each other. A participant indicated the position of a 
landmark by using a „camera-gun‟ which recorded the pointing direction as a still 
photograph. The participant pointed the camera-gun in what they thought was the 
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correct direction of the target landmark, and the experimenter took a photograph using 
a remote switch. The photographs were used to calculate the difference (in degrees) 
between a participant‟s pointing estimate and the correct direction. This difference 
was used as a measure of relational knowledge. 
The non-labelling condition was always carried out first (if the labelling 
condition occurred first this might influence the way that participants approached the 
task in a later non-labelling condition). The two routes, A and B, were 
counterbalanced so that half of the participants walked route A in the non-labelling 
condition and then route B in the labelling condition. The other half walked route B 
(non-labelling condition) then route A (labelling condition). The two conditions were 
administered on different days. 
After retracing the route once (in each condition) participants were asked to 
retrace the route a second time. We did this to assess the effect of repeated experience 
on route learning. Several participants declined to retrace the route a further time. As 
participants had already walked 2 km (guided experience and first retracing) we did 
not expect all participants to be willing to walk a further 1 km to complete retrace 2. 
 
Map task 
Participants viewed a 2 metre by 2 metre room, marked out by a cotton sheet 
on the floor of a laboratory. Four items were placed in the marked out room. These 
were two unique items (blue desk, green chair) and two non-unique items (identical 
red boxes). A coloured map (15 cm by 15 cm) of the area was drawn to match the 
layout and included symbols of the objects in the room (see Figure 1). 
Participants were tested using a procedure based on Blades and Cooke (1994). 
For each trial a small toy was hidden out of sight under one of the four objects by the 
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experimenter. While the experimenter did this, the participant could not see the room 
or the hiding places. After the toy was hidden the participant was shown the map. A 
yellow sticker was placed on the appropriate symbol on the map to indicate the 
location of the toy, and the experimenter also pointed to the correct symbol on the 
map. After seeing the map the participant was asked to go and find the toy in the 
room.  
There were two conditions: a non-rotated condition, when the map was 
correctly orientated to the room; and a rotated condition, when the map was rotated 
180° in relation to the room, with 12 trials per condition. In each condition the toy 
was hidden 3 times under each of the 4 items of the room (i.e. 6 trials at unique hiding 
places, 6 trials at identical hiding places). The trials were presented randomly, except 
that the first trial of the experiment the toy was hidden under one of the unique items. 
This was because young participants are usually more accurate at using maps to find 
hidden objects at unique places (Blades & Cooke, 1994) and we wanted to maximise 
the chance of success in the first trial.  
Perspective taking task  
Two perspective taking tasks were carried out. For both tasks, participants sat at a 
table, opposite the experimenter and were presented with stimulus cards (21cm by 21 cm). 
In the Level 1 perspective taking task, based on Flavell et al. (1981), participants 
were shown three stimulus cards, which had one item drawn on each side (apple/orange, 
car/boat, cat/dog). Participants were first asked to name the items on the card (e.g. 'apple' 
and 'orange'). The card was then held vertically between the experimenter and the 
participant, and the participant was asked, for example, ‘do you see the apple or the orange’ 
followed by ‘do I see the apple or the orange’. The card was then reversed and the questions 
were asked again, but the order in which the objects were named was reversed. This was 
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repeated for each stimulus card. The order of the cards and the sides shown were 
counterbalanced.  
A Level 2 perspective taking task was based on Massangkay et al. (1974). 
Participants viewed three single sided stimulus cards, each depicting a picture which 
had a distinct right-way-up (turtle, horse, table). After checking that a participant 
could understand and use the phrases „right-way up‟ and „upside down‟ appropriately, 
the participant was first shown a card so that the picture on it was „right-way-up‟ from 
the participant‟s point of view and they were asked if they saw the object the right-
way-up or upside-down (e.g. „do you see the turtle the right-way-up or upside-
down?‟).  The participant was then asked whether the experimenter saw the picture 
the right-way-up or upside-down (e.g. „do I see the turtle the right-way-up or upside-
down?‟). The experimenter then rotated the picture so that the object was now upside 
down from the participant‟s perspective and then repeated the questions. The order of 
presentation of pictures and the positions of the pictures (right-way-up or upside-
down) were counterbalanced. 
For both the level 1 and level 2 perspective taking tasks, 12 questions were 
asked (6 participant viewpoint, 6 experimenter viewpoint). Scores were awarded for 
the experimenter viewpoint trials only, because none of the participants had any 
difficulty describing their own views of the stimuli.  
Maze task 
The maze task, based on Gathercole and Pickering (2000), had two conditions, 
static and dynamic (see Figure 2). Each maze consisted of a stick-man in the centre, 
surrounded by two (level one) to six (level five) „walls‟ around the figure, and each 
wall had two entrance points. Entrance points in the walls were arranged so that they 
were positioned either on opposite sides, or adjacent sides, alternately. Participants 
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were asked to remember a route, from the outside of the maze to the man in the 
centre. They were shown the correct route by the experimenter and then asked to draw 
it from memory on a blank maze. In the static condition the correct route was shown 
as a red line drawn on a target maze, which was removed after a three second 
exposure. For the dynamic condition the researcher traced the correct route onto a 
blank maze. There were four trials at each of the five levels and a participant 
progressed to the next level when at least two out of four trials at a level were 
completed correctly. Participants were scored for the total number of trials correct 
(maximum score per condition: 20).  
 
Figures 1 and 2  
 
Results 
Route walking task 
Route knowledge 
Route knowledge was measured as the number of correct choices (maximum: 20) 
that a participant made during the first retracing of the route (see Figure 3). A two-way 
ANOVA was conducted on participants‟ route knowledge score for the first retrace of each 
route, with a between participant factor of group (WS, MLD, TD) and a within participant 
factor of condition (non-labelling, labelling). This showed a main effect of group (F(2, 
57)=35.72, p<.001, ηp
2
=.56) due to superior performance in the TD controls compared to the 
MLD and WS groups (p<.05 for both), and higher scores for the MLD group than the WS 
group (p=.02). There was also a main effect of condition (F(1, 57)=23.39, p<.001, ηp
2
=.29) 
due to higher scores on the labelling condition than the non-labelling condition. The 
interaction between condition and group was not significant, F(1, 57)=2.40, p=.10, ηp
2
=.08.  
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To further investigate the facilitation effect of labelling the route, correlations 
between route knowledge and verbal and non-verbal ability were explored. All three 
participant groups completed the WASI vocabulary subtest and the WASI matrices 
subtest, and so the raw scores for these subtests were used as estimates of verbal and 
non-verbal ability respectively. Significant correlations (two-tailed) were found only 
for the WS group; route knowledge was significantly or marginally positively 
associated with both verbal and non-verbal ability (verbal ability, non-labelling: r = 
.49, p=.03; labelling: r=.48, p=.03; non-verbal ability, non-labelling: r=.43, p=.06; 
labelling: r=.64, p=.003). For the TD and MLD groups there were no significant 
correlations (p>.05 for all). 
The extent to which route knowledge performance in each condition was 
specifically related to non-verbal skills and verbal skills respectively was examined 
using partial correlations. The variance that the WASI matrices (raw scores) shared 
with the WASI vocabulary (raw scores) was partialled out from the total variance 
associated with the WASI vocabulary so that only the variance in level of ability that 
was uniquely associated with the WASI vocabulary remained. Similarly, the variance 
that the WASI vocabulary shared with the WASI matrices was partialled out from the 
total variance of the WASI matrices, leaving only the variance uniquely associated 
with the WASI matrices, i.e., non-verbal ability. The patterns of results were not as 
expected, because variance uniquely associated with non-verbal ability was associated 
with performance for the WS group in the labelling condition only, in which stronger 
non-verbal ability was associated with a higher route knowledge score (r = .56, p=.01, 
two tailed). There were no other significant relationships (p>.05 for all, two-tailed). 
Learning was assessed by comparing performance on the first and second 
retrace of each route. A number of participants did not complete the second retrace of 
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the route due to fatigue. Where this occurred, rather than removing the participants 
who were matched to the missing participant, matching was considered to be at a 
group level (supported by independent t-tests). In the non-labelling condition, the 
number of participants who retraced the route twice was: WS, N=13; MLD, N=9; TD, 
N=17. Independent t-tests showed that matching was adequate: WS and TD, CA, 
t(28)=1.64, p=.11; WS and MLD, CA, t(20)=0.70, p=.49, non-verbal ability, t(20)=-
0.51, p=.61. In the labelling condition, the number of participants who retraced the 
route twice were: WS, N=11; MLD, N=11; TD, N=9 and they were adequately 
matched at the group level (WS and TD, CA: t(18)=1.06, p=.30; WS and MLD, CA: 
t(20)=0.81, p=.43, nonverbal ability: t(20)=-0.81, p=.43). 
Learning was assessed for the labelling and the non-labelling condition separately to 
optimise on remaining power (see Figure 4). Two ANOVAs were carried out on the number 
of correct turns (maximum: 20) with group as a between participant factor (WS, MLD, TD) 
and learning as a within participant factor (retrace 1, retrace 2). For both conditions, there 
was a main effect of group (non-labelling: F(2, 36)=26.66, p<.001, ηp
2
=.60; labelling: F(2, 
28)=3.74, p=.04, ηp
2
=.21) which was due to higher scores in the TD group than the WS and 
MLD groups in both conditions (p<.05 for all). In the non-labelling condition there were 
also higher scores for the MLD group than the WS group (non-labelling: p=.05; labelling: 
F<1). Significant learning was shown from retrace 1 to retrace 2 (non-labelling: F(1, 
36)=51.74, p<.001, ηp
2
=.59; labelling: F(1, 28)=40.81, p<.001, ηp
2
=.59). For the non-
labelling condition only, there was also a significant interaction between learning and group 
(F(2, 36)=5.64, p=.01, ηp
2
=.24). Individual group analysis showed that although learning 
occurred for all three groups in this condition, learning was stronger in the MLD group than 
for the TD and WS groups (WS: F(1, 12)=6.07, p=.03, ηp
2
=.34; MLD, F(1, 8)=52.36, 
p<.001, ηp
2
=.87; TD:  F(1, 16)=10.82, p=.01, ηp
2
=.40). Although the TD group showed 
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significant learning, we noted that TD performance was at ceiling by the second retrace of 
each route (non-labelling: t(16)=-1.85, p=.08; labelling: t(8)=-1.51, p=.17). 
Figures 3 and 4  
Relational knowledge 
Relational knowledge was assessed by the pointing task and accuracy was 
measured as the difference (in degrees) between a participant‟s pointing to a landmark 
and the actual direction of the landmark during the first retrace of the route. 
Measurements were made to within one degree. A second experimenter coded a 
random 25% of the data for each group. Analysis of inter-rater reliability by 
Cronbach‟s alpha showed high reliability, r2 = 1.00, p<.001. The pointing measure 
was an error score and therefore a lower score indicated better performance. The 
maximum possible error was 180°. One participant with WS did not produce any 
pointing data, and so the WS group had a maximum N of 19. For each walk of the 
route, participants made 12 pointing estimates and the mean of these 12 estimates was 
calculated for each participant. 
 The mean scores for the first retrace of the route were compared to chance 
performance of 90° (guessing would produce errors from 0° to 180°, with a mean of 
90°). In both the non-labelling and labelling condition, all three groups performed 
above chance (one-sample t-tests against chance, p<.001 for all). The mean scores 
were analysed by ANOVA, with a between participant factor of group (WS, MLD, 
TD) and a within participant factor of condition (non-labelling, labelling). There was 
a main effect of group (F(1, 56) = 60.21, p<.001, ηp
2
=.68). This was due to 
substantially higher accuracy for the TD controls, where mean error was 36.41° (non-
labelling) and 29.25° (labelling), than the other groups where mean error was 
consistently above 65° (TD vs. MLD, WS: p<.05 for both; WS vs. MLD: F<1). The 
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main effect of condition was not significant (F<1). The interaction between condition 
and group was not significant (F(2, 56)=2.57, p=.09, ηp
2
=.08) (see Figure 5). 
The effect of learning on relational knowledge was assessed by comparing 
pointing errors for the first and second retracing of the route (see Figure 6). As noted 
with reference to the route knowledge analysis, not all participants retraced the route a 
second time. There was an additional loss of data from participants who walked the 
route a second time, but failed to provide pointing data. As such, these participants 
provided route knowledge, but not relational knowledge data for the second retrace of 
the route. Participant numbers are therefore slightly fewer than for the route 
knowledge analysis (non labelling condition: WS, N=13; MLD, N=7; TD, N=17; 
labelling condition: WS, N=11; MLD, N=9; TD, N=8), but still appropriately matched 
at a group level (p>.05 for all group comparisons). The analysis above indicated that 
performance was above chance for the first retrace of the route. Mean scores for the 
second retrace of the route showed that the WS and TD groups performed above 
chance for both the non-labelling and labelling condition (one-sample t-tests against 
chance, p<.05 for all), but the MLD group performed only marginally above chance in 
the non-labelling condition (p=.09) and at chance in the labelling condition (p=.26). 
Given that performance on the first retrace of the route indicated that all groups 
understood the task, and that mean performance did not reduce in this group from 
retrace 1 to retrace 2 (see Figure 6), this effect appears to be accounted for by a loss of 
power on account of reduced participant numbers. As such, the MLD group were not 
excluded from subsequent analyses. Two ANOVAs were conducted with a between 
participant factor of group (WS, MLD, TD) and a within participant factor of learning 
(retrace 1, retrace 2). For both conditions this showed a main effect of group (non-
labelling, F(2, 34)= 27.08, p<.001, ηp
2
=.61; labelling, F(2, 25)=20.57, p<.001, 
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ηp
2
=.62) due to higher accuracy from the TD group than the WS and MLD groups 
(p<.05 for all), but similar accuracy for the WS and MLD groups (p>.05 for both 
conditions). There was no main effect of learning in either condition (F<1 for both). 
The interaction between group and learning was significant for the non-labelling 
condition only (non-labelling: F(2, 34)=6.71, p=.003, ηp
2
=.28) which was because the 
TD group showed significant learning (F(1, 16)=10.07, p=.01, ηp
2
=.39), but the WS 
group showed a marginal effect in the opposite direction (WS: F(1, 12)=4.32, p=.06, 
ηp
2
=.27: retrace 1 < retrace 2), and the MLD group showed no evidence of learning 
(F<1).  
Figures 5 and 6  
 
Map task 
 In both the aligned and rotated conditions of the map task all three groups 
were at ceiling, as predicted, when the toy was hidden in one of the unique hiding 
places, and therefore we only considered performance when the toy was hidden in one 
of the identical hiding places.  
There were 6 trials in the aligned condition and 6 trials in the rotated condition 
when the toy was hidden at an identical place. The mean scores are shown in Figure 7. 
The TD group was at ceiling for the identical hiding places in both conditions and so 
analysis was between the WS and MLD groups. 
Although there were always four hiding places in each trial (two unique and 
two identical places), as participants were always correct when the toy was hidden at 
a unique place we adopted a conservative measure of chance performance (50%) for 
trials at the two identical hiding places. We therefore compared the performance of 
the WS and MLD groups against chance performance of 3 correct trials out of 6  In 
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the aligned condition both groups were better than chance (one-sample t-test against 
chance, WS, MLD: p<.001 for both). In the rotated condition the MLD group were 
better than chance (p=.001), but the WS group performed at chance (p= .27). 
ANOVA was carried out with group (WS, MLD) as a between participant 
factor and condition (aligned, rotated) as a within participant factor. The main effect 
of group was marginal (F(1, 38)=3.47, p=.07, ηp
2
=.08) due to stronger performance in 
the MLD group than the WS group, although the chance performance of the WS 
group might have attenuated the effect. The main effect of condition was significant, 
because there was superior performance in the aligned condition than the rotated 
condition (F(1, 38)=24.77, p<.001, ηp
2
=.40). The interaction between group and 
condition was not significant (F(1, 38)=1.07, p=.31, ηp
2
=.03). 
Perspective taking task 
For the Level 1 perspective taking task performance was at ceiling for all three 
groups, and was therefore not analysed  
For the Level 2 perspective taking task participants had to say whether a 
picture placed on the table between them and the experimenter was right way up or 
upside down from the point of view of the experimenter. Participants who guessed an 
answer would have been correct on 50% of the six trials. 
The Level 2 task produced ceiling effects for the TD controls, better than 
chance performance in the MLD group and chance performance in the WS group 
(one-sample t-test compared to chance, MLD: p=.03; WS: p=.68) (see Figure 8). An 
independent t-test between the performance of the WS and the MLD groups showed 
that the MLD group had a marginally higher score (t(38)=2.00, p=.053).  
Maze task 
 24 
The mean scores for the maze task are shown in Figure 9. All participants 
scored significantly above floor performance (WS static and dynamic conditions: 
p=.001 for both; TD and MLD static and dynamic conditions: p<.001 for all). 
Importantly, this indicated that, although the WS group had low scores, they did 
understand the task. 
An ANOVA was conducted to compare the performance of the three groups in 
both conditions (static, dynamic). This revealed a main effect of group (F(2, 
57)=74.13, p<.001, ηp
2
=.72) due to higher TD than WS and MLD performance (p<.05 
for both), and higher MLD performance than WS performance ( p=.01). The effect of 
condition showed marginally higher performance in the dynamic condition than the 
static condition (F(1, 57)=3.59, p=.06, ηp
2
=.06). The interaction between condition 
and group was not significant, F<1. 
Figures 7, 8 and 9  
 
Correlational analyses 
 To determine whether performance on small-scale and large-scale tasks was 
related, correlations were carried out between route knowledge and relational 
knowledge on the route walking task, and performance on the three small-scale tasks: 
the maze task, the perspective taking task, and the map task. For the route walking 
task, the non-labelling condition, retrace 1, was used because this condition provided 
the best reflection of how participants would perform in an everyday route leaning 
context. For the maze task, the sum of correct responses for the static and dynamic 
mazes was used. For perspective taking, the level 2 task only was included due to 
ceiling performance on the level 1 task. For the map task, the sum of correct 
responses for the identical hiding places in the aligned and the rotated conditions was 
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included. The only significant correlations (two-tailed) between the small-scale and 
large-scale tasks related to the maze task. For the MLD group, performance on the 
maze task correlated with large-scale route knowledge only (r = .50, p=.03). For the 
WS group, maze task performance correlated with large-scale route knowledge (r = 
.49, p=.03) and relational knowledge (r = -.49, p=.03) in the predicted directions. 
None of the other comparisons were significant (p>.05 for all). 
 
Discussion 
Individuals with WS were able to learn a route. Even at the first retracing of 
the route (non labelling condition) the participants with WS recalled over half of the 
turns, and with practice and verbal support (the second retrace in the labelling 
condition) the participants with WS recalled, on average, all but about 2 of the 20 
turns. This finding indicates that participants with WS have the potential to learn a 
new route through an unfamiliar environment, and can do so after quite limited 
exposure to the route, even though they may take longer than TD people to achieve 
optimal performance. We discuss the differences between the abilities of the three 
groups, but it should be borne in mind that these differences are differences between 
relatively good performance by all of the groups. 
Despite good performance on the route learning task, the participants with WS 
and MLD did much less well than the TD group on the measure of relational 
knowledge. This measure indicated how well an individual formed an understanding 
of the relative position of different places in the environment. With experience, in 
areas such as those used here a TD adult will usually have an accurate awareness of 
all the spatial relationships between all the places (Kitchin & Blades, 2001). Indeed 
we found that the TD adults pointed accurately between unseen places, with errors, 
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overall, of only about 30°, and we also found that the TD group improved on the 
pointing measure with greater experience of the route. In contrast, both the other 
groups performed less well than the TD group, and had errors between 70° and 80°. 
Although this was less then chance performance of 90° for retrace 1, it is high enough 
to demonstrate that the WS and MLD groups had quite an inaccurate understanding of 
the relationship between places in the environment. Indeed, for retrace 2, with 
reduced participant numbers, for the MLD group this level of error no longer differed 
from chance. This high level of error is consistent with evidence for poor spatial 
relation encoding on small-scale tasks in WS (Farran & Jarrold, 2005; Nardini et al., 
2008). In contrast to the TD group, greater experience did not lead to improved 
relational knowledge for either MLD or WS groups. Although the ability to learn a 
route always precedes (developmentally and temporally) the ability to encode spatial 
relationships in the environment (Blades, 1991; Siegel & White, 1975) the poor 
performance of the WS and MLD groups in the pointing task and their failure to 
improve with greater experience suggests that the disjunction between learning a 
route and learning environmental relationships may be greater for WS and MLD 
participants than for TD participants. This suggests that, although individuals with 
WS are able to learn a novel route, they do this by relying on learning a specific set of 
turns and landmarks. The reliance on route knowledge in WS is an important finding, 
as it suggests that despite being able to learn a route, individuals with WS would not 
be able to deviate from that route to find a short cut or to make a detour. This 
observation holds also for individuals with MLD. 
The dissociation in WS between route knowledge and relational knowledge 
could reflect a neural dissociation. In TD adults there are two systems: place learning 
is a flexible system, dependent on the hippocampus, which relies on relational 
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knowledge and the building of a cognitive map, whilst the second, less flexible 
system, is an action-based system which relies on route knowledge and activates the 
caudate nucleus (Doeller, King & Burgess, 2008; Hartley et al., 2003). Indeed, 
Hartley et al. (2003) report that when TD adults were presented with an unfamiliar 
route, good navigators activated their hippocampus and hence their place learning 
system, but poor navigators did not, and relied on their action-based system. It is 
therefore possible that the reliance on route knowledge in WS stems from atypical 
hippocampal functioning as observed by Meyer-Lindenberg et al. (2004).  
The above dissociation might also relate to the use of different frames of 
reference. Nardini et al. (2008) described a discrepancy in WS between the use of a 
body frame of reference versus an intrinsic frame of reference. If individuals with WS 
use their relatively good body frame of reference to encode the turns along the route, 
then coupled with correct landmark encoding, this would suggest an ability to acquire 
route knowledge in WS. In contrast, relational knowledge involves encoding the 
spatial relationships between landmarks from a number of perspectives. This involves 
an intrinsic frame of reference, a relative weakness in WS, and thus is consistent with 
the poor relational knowledge observed in this study. However, we must be cautious 
in suggesting that the variables measured in our study (large-scale variables) relate 
directly to those considered by Nardini et al. (2008) (small-scale variables), especially 
because we were unable to show a direct relationship between small-scale and large-
scale performance. 
An effect of labelling was found for route knowledge, but not for relational 
knowledge. It therefore appears that relational knowledge did not benefit from verbal 
coding in typical or atypical populations. For both measures, the pattern of 
performance of the WS group was comparable to that of the control groups. If 
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individuals with WS spontaneously scaffold their poor non-verbal abilities with verbal 
coding, then either no effect or a reduced effect of labelling would have been 
observed in this group. The results suggest that: first, individuals with WS do not 
spontaneously use a verbal strategy when learning the turns along a route; second, 
explicit instructions to encode visuo-spatial information using verbal cues are 
beneficial in WS. The level of benefit is akin to that of the typical population and to 
that of MLD individuals. This has a third implication that the use of spatial terms did 
not inhibit verbal facilitation in WS. 
Route knowledge was not specifically related to verbal or to non-verbal ability 
in any group; the performance of the WS group was related to both verbal and non-
verbal ability, but no correlations were observed in the control groups. This lack of 
correlation might be explained by a strong memory component to the task. However, 
maze task performance, a measure of visuo-spatial working memory (Gathercole & 
Pickering, 2000) only correlated with route learning ability in the learning difficulty 
groups. The contribution of memory could explain the lack of correlation with verbal 
or non-verbal ability in the MLD group, but not in the TD group. Some of the TD 
participants scored close to ceiling for route knowledge, which might explain the lack 
of correlations for this group. 
Farran et al. (1999) observed that, in WS, non-verbal tasks in which 
performance was relatively poor or relatively strong were associated with the variance 
uniquely related to non-verbal ability or to verbal ability respectively. This was 
investigated in the present study with the prediction that route knowledge on the non-
labelling and labelling conditions would be associated with variance uniquely 
associated with non-verbal and verbal ability respectively. This prediction was not 
supported: the two control groups showed no unique associations, and the associations 
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in the WS group were not as expected; route knowledge was uniquely associated to 
non-verbal ability in the labelling condition, but not in the non-labelling condition as 
predicted. This finding suggests that labelling enables individuals with WS to make 
better use of their non-verbal skills; perhaps labelling encourages these individuals to 
systematically visualise each part of the route, leading to better recall. 
Participants led the experimenter around the route twice. Caution must be 
taken in interpreting analyses of learning, because participant numbers were reduced. 
The participants who did not complete the second retrace may have been those who 
found the task more challenging, tiring, or boring. If so, the remaining members of 
each group are a less representative sample of the population, because they were a 
self-selected subset of the original sample. Nevertheless, the results from the second 
retrace give an indication of the effects of repetition in WS. Repetition of the route 
improved route knowledge across all three groups. Thus, in addition to verbal coding, 
individuals with WS benefitted from repeated experience for the measure of route 
knowledge. In the labelling condition the extent of learning on route knowledge in the 
WS group was similar to that of the control groups. In the non-labelling condition, the 
improvement in route knowledge in the WS group was comparable to that of the TD 
controls, whilst the MLD controls showed a relatively stronger effect of learning. As 
the TD controls were at ceiling for the second retrace of the route, it is possible that 
the effect of learning was constrained. Comparison between the MLD and WS group 
suggests that, without the aid of verbal coding, individuals with MLD looked for 
alternative strategies for learning the route, and that this comes to fruition by their 
second retrace of the route. In the labelling condition, this is less necessary, as the 
strategy of verbal coding has already been suggested, and so this strategy was used 
effectively across groups, with comparable learning outcomes. The WS group 
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however, did not appear to be seeking strategies in either condition, and so show 
similar learning across conditions, despite improved performance overall in the 
labelling condition.  
In contrast to route knowledge, relational knowledge did not improve with 
repetition of the route, with the exception of the TD group, in the non-labelling 
condition only. The absence of a learning effect might relate to the lack of feedback; 
errors in route knowledge were corrected to continue the route, but errors in relational 
knowledge were not corrected. It is possible that, without feedback, participants were 
less aware of their errors or were less able to improve their performance on the second 
retrace. It is likely that awareness of level of performance was stronger in the TD 
group than the two learning difficulty groups, due to their higher IQ. If this is the 
case, the differentiation between the labelling and non-labelling condition in the TD 
group might relate to differences in the ability to recall the four landmarks across 
conditions. Verbalising the route might have made the four to-be-remembered 
landmarks less salient, due to the numerous other potential landmarks that were 
pointed out. If so, it might have been easier for the TD group to show improved 
performance in the non-labelling condition, as the only landmarks that had been 
pointed out were the four landmarks used to assess relational knowledge. In sum, the 
pattern observed in the TD group could have been related to two factors: increased 
critical awareness of their own performance, and interference from additional 
landmarks in the labelling condition.  
The patterns of performance on the small-scale tasks showed some similarities 
to large-scale abilities across the participant groups. In both the level 2 perspective 
taking task and the identical hiding places conditions of the map task, WS 
performance was marginally weaker than the MLD controls. Both tasks include 
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relational knowledge: in the perspective task the participant has to consider the spatial 
relationship between the experimenter‟s position and the picture on the table; and in 
the map task the hiding place could be identified only by relating the hiding place to 
some other feature in the room. As the difference between WS and MLD was only 
marginal for these tasks, one could argue that this pattern is similar to the pattern of 
relational knowledge in the large-scale task in which WS performance was at the level 
of the MLD group. However, the WS group showed chance performance with 
identical hiding places in the rotated version of the map task and also had chance 
performance in the level 2 perspective taking task, which could suggest a particular 
weakness in WS for these small-scale tasks. If this is the case, then the pattern of 
relational knowledge is different between small-scale and large-scale environments. 
Note that the measure of relational knowledge taken in the large-scale task was 
relatively more sensitive as it was a continuous variable, compared to the small-scale 
tasks where participants gave one of two possible answers. One could argue that, if a 
more sensitive measure of relational knowledge were taken on a small-scale task, then 
poor, but above chance performance, might also be observed. This would not however 
predict that group comparisons would show different patterns to those observed here. 
This last conclusion is supported by the lack of correlations between the 
measures of small-scale and large-scale relational knowledge in any of the participant 
groups. Our results, therefore, do not support Allen et al.‟s (1996) claim that 
performance on small-scale perspective taking tasks is related to performance in tasks 
involving large-scale relational knowledge.  
Performance in maze tasks has been linked to performance in large-scale route 
knowledge tasks (Allen et al., 1996). Performance on the maze task used in our study 
did not correlate with route knowledge for the TD group, but it did for the MLD and 
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WS groups. Thus, the only support for Allen et al‟s (1996) suggestion that maze task 
performance is related to route knowledge was from the groups with learning 
difficulties. For the WS group, performance on the maze task also correlated with 
relational knowledge, which was not predicted by Allen et al. (1996). Furthermore, 
the WS group showed particularly poor performance on the maze task, which 
contrasted to their route knowledge. As such, these findings did not provide evidence 
for a relationship between the small-scale maze learning task and large-scale route 
knowledge. 
Overall, in our study performance on the small-scale tasks was not related to 
performance in the real world environment. This finding is in line with studies of TD 
children (Quaiser-Pohl et al., 2002) and adults (Hegarty & Waller, 2005) that have 
also failed to find a relationship between small and large-scale spatial performance. 
We have shown that the previous findings for TD children and adults also apply to 
WS and MLD groups. This supports the notion that small and large-scale performance 
are two distinct areas of spatial ability, supported by independent mechanisms. Such 
mechanisms have not yet been agreed upon. However, Quaiser-Pohl et al. (2002) 
distinguish between “large-scale tasks in which the observer is part of the 
environment and cannot see the whole space of interest from one point of view, and 
small-scale tasks… where the spatial relations of objects can be seen at once” (page 
95) and “…the movement of one‟s body position is not important” (page 104).  
The lack of a relationship between small and large-scale tasks for WS has an 
important implication for research into visuo-spatial cognition in WS. To date, this 
research is predominantly based on laboratory tasks, and although very valuable in 
extending our knowledge about WS abilities, any extrapolations from such tasks to 
real world everyday contexts should be treated with caution. Impairments in WS on 
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small and large-scale tasks, do not appear to indicate a common deficit, and should be 
considered as independent deficits to two distinct mechanisms. 
We found that the participants with WS performed at chance in the level 2 
perspective taking task, and in the rotated version of the map task when the hiding 
place was one of two identical targets. This demonstrates that these tasks were too 
difficult for the WS participants. Given that the WS group was matched to the MLD 
group by Performance IQ, this indicates specific weaknesses in the component factors 
measured by these tasks, within the visuo-spatial domain. Individuals with WS could 
complete the non-rotated condition of the map task with identical hiding places, 
which involved relational knowledge. Successful completion in the rotated condition 
is additionally dependent on the ability to mentally rotate the map. Poor performance 
in this condition seems to relate to poor mental rotation abilities. This is consistent 
with previous findings that have reported poor mental rotation in WS (Farran & 
Jarrold, 2004). We also found that level 1 perspective taking was successfully 
completed by the WS group, but level 2 perspective taking was not. This task is 
dependent on a participant‟s ability to determine whether they or the experimenter see 
an object as the right-way-up or upside-down, and so also has a strong mental rotation 
component. Poor performance was also observed on the maze task. This is best 
explained by impaired visuo-spatial working memory in WS (Jarrold, Baddeley & 
Hewes, 1998b; Vicari, Bellucci & Carlisimo, 2003). Jarrold et al. (1998b) 
demonstrated a Corsi span of between two and three spatial locations in WS, and 
therefore our maze task, which was visually more complex and involved remembering 
at least two „entrances‟, may have been at the limit of working memory capacity of 
the WS participants.  
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The WS participants were successful in the map task when the toy was hidden 
in one of the two unique hiding places. This involved only matching (e.g. symbol of 
green chair on the map to green chair in the room), rather than spatial abilities. When 
the toy was hidden at one of the two identical places participants had to disambiguate 
the correct red box. The WS participants could do this if the map was aligned with the 
room. This indicates that they appreciated that if the correct red box was, for example, 
on the left of the map then it was on the left in the room. However, when the map was 
rotated participants needed to consider the spatial relationships within the layout (e.g. 
that the correct red box was opposite the chair) and WS participants were unable to do 
this. Therefore, the WS participants understood some aspects of using a map (symbol-
to-place correspondence, and map-to-room directional correspondence, when 
aligned). However, they were poor at identifying the map-to-room spatial 
correspondences within the layout. The latter skill is a key aspect of everyday map 
using because maps include multiple identical symbols and are not usually aligned 
with an environment. Users must identify the correspondences between spatial 
patterns on the map and those same spatial patterns in the environment. Given our 
findings we suggest that people with WS will have difficulty recognizing such spatial 
correspondences and that they would not benefit from using maps when learning new 
environments.  
In summary, the results demonstrated that individuals with WS can learn a 
route through a natural environment, and that route knowledge could be improved by 
verbal coding of the route, and by walking it more than once. The extent of this 
improvement was comparable to the improvement in both CA matched TD controls, 
and MLD controls matched by CA and Performance IQ. This ability does have some 
limitations as the WS group did not show an understanding of the relationship 
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between landmarks on the route. As this is a function of the hippocampus in typical 
development (e.g. Hartley et al., 2003), this is consistent with evidence for atypical 
hippocampal function in WS (Meyer-Lindenberg et al., 2004) and implies limited 
ability to deviate from a learnt route. It is not possible to determine from our study, 
whether relational knowledge develops in WS as an environment becomes more 
familiar. Despite these difficulties with relational knowledge, the finding of relatively 
good route knowledge in WS has important practical implications because we 
demonstrated that, given some verbal support and practice, people with WS are 
capable of learning a complex real world route. They can learn such routes 
successfully despite major deficits in their performance in many small-scale spatial 
tasks (e.g. map and maze tasks) that, traditionally, have been linked to expertise in 
wayfinding.  
 
 
 36 
Acknowledgements 
This study was funded by the Economic and Social Research Council, grant number: 
RES000221175. 
The authors would like to thank the members of the Williams Syndrome Foundation, 
UK, for their participation in this study, the staff and students at the Avenue Special 
School for their co-operation with this work and Susie Formby, who was the second 
coder of the relational knowledge data. 
 37 
References 
Allen, G.L., Kirasic, K.C., Dobson, S.H., Long, R.G. & Beck, S. (1996). Predicting 
environmental learning from spatial abilities: An indirect route. Intelligence, 22, 
327-355.  
Arnold, R., Yule, W., & Martin, N. (1985). The psychological characteristics of 
infantile hypercalcaemia: A preliminary investigation. Developmental Medicine 
and Child Neurology, 27, 49-59. 
Atkinson, J., Braddick, O., Rose, F. E., Searcy, Y. M., Wattam-Bell, J., & Bellugi, U. 
(2006). Dorsal-stream motion processing deficits persist into adulthood in 
Williams syndrome. Neuropsychologia, 44, 828-833. 
Atkinson, J., King, J., Braddick, O., Nokes, L., Anker, S., & Braddick, F. (1997). A 
specific deficit of dorsal stream function in Williams syndrome. Neuroreport: 
Cognitive Neuroscience and Neuropsychology, 8, 1919-1922. 
Baddeley, A., Emslie, H., & Nimmo-Smith, I. (1994). The Doors and People test: A 
test of visual and verbal recall and recognition. Bury-St-Edmunds: Thames 
Valley Test Company. 
Bellugi, U., Wang, P. P., & Jernigan, T. L. (1994). Williams syndrome: An unusual 
neuropsychological profile. In S. H. Broman & J. Grafman (Eds.), Atypical 
cognitive deficits in developmental disorders: Implications for brain function (pp. 
23-56). Hillsdale, N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 
Blades, M. (1991). Wayfinding theory and research. The need for a new approach. In 
D. M. Mark & A. U. Frank (Eds.), Cognitive and linguistic aspects of geographic 
space (pp 137-165). Dordrecht: Kluwer. 
Blades, M. & Cooke, Z. (1994). Young children's ability to understand a model as a 
spatial representation. Journal of Genetic Psychology, 155, 201-218. 
 38 
Brock, J., Brown, G. D. A., & Boucher, J. (2006). Free recall in Williams syndrome: 
Is there a dissociation between short- and long-term memory? Cortex, 42, 366-
375. 
Doeller,C.F., King,J.A., Burgess,N. (2008). Parallel striatal and hippocampal systems 
for landmarks and boundaries in spatial memory. PNAS 105, 5915-5920 
Dunn, L. M., Dunn, L. M., Whetton, C., & Pintilie, D. (1982). British Picture 
Vocabulary Scale. Windsor, UK: NFER-Nelson. 
Farran, E.K., Jarrold, C. & Gathercole, S.E. (1999). Visuo-spatial cognition in 
Williams syndrome: an uneven profile of abilities. British Psychological Society 
Developmental Section Annual Conference, Nottingham, September 1999.   
Farran, E.K., & Jarrold, C. (2004). Exploring block construction and mental imagery: 
Evidence of atypical orientation discrimination in Williams syndrome. Visual 
Cognition, 11, 1019-1040 
Farran, E.K. & Jarrold, C. (2003). Visuo-spatial cognition in Williams syndrome; 
Reviewing and accounting for the strengths and weaknesses in performance. 
Developmental Neuropsychology, 23, 175-202 
Farran, E.K., Jarrold, C. & Gathercole, S.E. (2001). Block Design performance in the 
Williams syndrome phenotype: A problem with mental imagery? Journal of Child 
Psychology and Psychiatry, 42, 719-728. 
Flavell, J.H., Everitt, B., Croft, K., & Flavell, E. (1981). Young children's knowledge 
about visual perception: Further evidence for the Level 1 - Level 2 distinction. 
Developmental Psychology, 17, 99-103. 
Freundschuh, S. M. (2000). Micro- and macro-scale environments. In R. Kitchin & S. 
M. Freundschuh (Eds.), Cognitive mapping: Past present and future (pp125-146). 
London: Routledge. 
 39 
Gathercole, S. E., & Pickering, S. J. (2000). Assessment of working memory in six- 
and seven-year-old children. Journal of Educational Psychology, 92, 377-390. 
Grant, J., Karmiloff-Smith, A., Gathercole, S. E., Paterson, S., Howlin, P., Davies, 
M., et al. (1997). Phonological short-term memory and its relationship to language 
in Williams syndrome. Cognitive Neuropsychiatry, 2, 81-99. 
Han, S., Song, Y., Ding, Y., Yund, E. W., & Woods, D. L. (2001). Neural substrates 
for visual perceptual grouping in humans. Psychophysiology, 38, 926-935. 
Hartley, T., Maguire, E. A., Spiers, H. J., & Burgess, N. (2003). The well-worn route 
and the path less travelled: distinct neural bases of route following and 
wayfinding in humans. Neuron, 37, 877-888. 
Hegarty, M. & Waller, D. (2005). Individual differences in spatial abilities. In P. Shah 
& A. Miyake (Eds.), Cambridge handbook of visuospatial thinking (pp 121-169). 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
Jarrold, C., Baddeley, A.D. & Hewes, A.K. (1998a).  Verbal and nonverbal abilities in 
the Williams syndrome phenotype: Evidence for diverging development 
trajectories. Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry, 39, 511-523.  
Jarrold, C., Baddeley, A. D., & Hewes, A. K. (1998b). Genetically dissociated 
components of working memory: evidence from Down's and Williams 
Syndrome. Neuropsychologia, 37, 637-651. 
  
Jarrold, C., Baddeley, A. D., & Phillips, C. (2007). Long-term memory for verbal and 
visual information in Down syndrome and Williams syndrome: Performance on 
the doors and people test. Cortex, 43, 233-247. 
 40 
Jordan, H., Reiss, J., Hoffman, J. E., & Landau, B. (2002). Intact perception of 
biological motion in the face of profound spatial deficits: Williams syndrome. 
Psychological Science, 13, 162-167. 
Kitchin, R. & Blades, M. (2001). The cognition of geographic space. London: Tauris. 
Laing, E., & Jarrold, C. (2007). Comprehension of spatial language in Williams 
syndrome: Evidence for impaired spatial representation of verbal descriptions. 
Clinical Linguistics and Phonetics, 21, 689-704. 
Landau, B., & Hoffman, J. E. (2005). Parallels between spatial cognition and spatial 
language: Evidence from Williams syndrome. Journal of Memory and Language, 
53, 163-185. 
Landau, B. & Hoffman, J. E. (2007). Explaining selective spatial breakdown in 
Williams Syndrome in J. M. Plumert & J. P. Spencer (Eds.), The emerging 
spatial mind (pp290-319). Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Lenhoff, H. M., Wang, P. P., Greenberg, F., & Bellugi, U. (1997). Williams syndrome 
and the brain. Scientific American, 277(6), 42-47. 
Lukács, A., Pléh, C., & Racsmány, M. (2007). Spatial language in Williams 
syndrome: Evidence for a special interaction? Journal of Child Language, 34, 
311-343. 
Masangkay, Z. S., McCluskey, K.A., McIntyre, C.W., Sims-Knight, J.Vaughn, B.E. 
& Flavell, J.H. (1974). The early development of inferences about the visual 
percepts of others. Child Development, 45, 237-246. 
Meyer-Lindenberg, A., Mervis, C. B., Sarpal, D., Koch, P., Steele, S., Kohn, P., et al. 
(2005). Functional, structural, and metabolic abnormalities of the hippocampal 
formation in Williams syndrome. Journal of Clinical Investigation, 115, 1888-
1895. 
 41 
Meyer-Lindenberg, A., Kohn, P., Mervis, C. B., Kippenham, J. S., Olsen, R. A., 
Morris, C. A., et al. (2004). Neural basis of genetically determined visuospatial 
construction deficit in Williams syndrome. Neuron, 43, 623-631. 
Morris, C. A., & Mervis, C. B. (1999). Williams Syndrome. In S. Goldstein & C. R. 
Reynolds (Eds.), Handbook of neurodevelopmental and genetic disorders in 
children (pp. 555-590). New York London: The Guilford Press. 
Nardini, N., Atkinson, J., Braddick, O., Burgess, N. (2008). Developmental 
trajectories for spatial frames of reference in Williams syndrome. Developmental 
Science, 11, 583-595. 
Pagon, R. A., Bennett, F. C., LaVeck, B., Stewart, K. B., & Johnson, J. (1987). 
Williams syndrome: Features in late childhood and adolescence. Pediatrics, 80, 
25-26. 
Philips, C., Jarrold, C., Baddeley, A., Grant, J., & Karmiloff-Smith, A. (2004). 
Comprehension of spatial language terms in Williams syndrome: Evidence for an 
interaction between domains of strength and weakness. Cortex, 40, 85-101. 
Quaiser-Pohl, C., Lehmann, W., & Eid, M. (2004). The relationship between spatial 
abilities and representations of large-scale space in children - a structural 
equation modelling analysis. Personality and Individual Differences, 36, 95-107. 
Raven, J. C. (1993). Coloured progressive matrices. Oxford, UK: Information Press 
Ltd. 
Siegel, A. W. & White, S. (1975). The development of spatial representation of large-
scale environments. In Reese, H. (Ed.), Advances in Child Development and 
Behavior. Volume 10 (pp 9-55). New York : Academic Press. 
 42 
Udwin, O., Davies, M., & Howlin, P. (1996). A longitudinal study of cognitive 
abilities and educational attainment in Williams syndrome. Developmental 
Medicine and Child Neurology, 38, 1020-1029. 
Udwin, O., & Yule, W. (1990). Expressive language of children with Williams 
syndrome. American Journal of Medical Genetics Supplement, 6, 108-114. 
Vicari, S., Brizzolara, D., Carlesimo, G. A., Pezzini, G., & Volterra, V. (1996). 
Memory in Williams syndrome. Cortex, 32, 503-537. 
Vicari, S., Bellucci, S., Santa Marinella, G., & Carlesimo, G. A. (2003). Visual and 
spatial working memory dissociation: evidence from Williams syndrome. 
Developmental Medicine and Child Neurology, 45, 269-273. 
Wechsler, D. (1999). Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence. San Antonio, TX: 
The Psychological Corporation.
 43 
Table 1: Participant details 
Group CA (years; months) PIQ VIQ FSIQ 
 Mean (S.D.) Range Mean (S.D.) 
WS (n=20) 15;04 (5;02) 8;06 – 25;01 62.30 (9.47) 62.20 (9.20) 59.30 (8.82) 
MLD (n=20) 14;11 (5;05) 7;09 -26;03 63.25 (6.84) 63.90 (11.41) 60.80 (8.95) 
TD (n=20) 15:03 (4;09) 8;08 – 24;00   114.25 (16.80) 
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Figure Captions 
Figure 1a: Room layout for map task 
Figure 1b: Map used in map task 
Figure 2: Maze task stimulus examples: level 1, static condition and level 3, dynamic 
condition 
Figure 3: Route knowledge: mean (s.e.) correct responses for first retrace across 
conditions 
Figure 4: Route knowledge: mean (s.e.) correct responses for first and second retrace 
across conditions 
Figure 5: Relational knowledge: mean (s.e.) errors (degrees) for first retrace across 
conditions 
Figure 6: Relational knowledge: mean (s.e.) errors (degrees) for first and second 
retrace across conditions 
Figure 7: Map task: mean (s.e.) correct responses for identical hiding places in aligned 
and rotated conditions 
Figure 8: Perspective taking level 2 task: mean (s.e.) correct responses 
Figure 9: Maze task: mean (s.e.) correct responses for static and dynamic conditions 
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